One month before the U.S. invasion of Iraq, three State Department bureau chiefs warned of "serious planning gaps for post-conflict public security and humanitarian assistance" in a secret memorandum prepared for a superior.
The State Department officials, who had been discussing the issues with top military officers at the Central Command, noted that the military was reluctant "to take on 'policing' roles" in Iraq after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. The three officials warned that "a failure to address short-term public security and humanitarian assistance concerns could result in serious human rights abuses which would undermine an otherwise successful military campaign, and our reputation internationally."
Not a huge thunderbolt, but it does highlight one of the most outrageous aspects of the Bush gang's failure in Iraq, that the expertise of career analysts and researchers at State was dismissed because their suggestions and ideas didn't comport with Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz's rosy vision of post-invasion Iraq. Disgraceful.