BEARING FRUIT?

Juan Cole responds to Fareed Zakaria's claim that Bush has been proved right on some of the big questions in the Middle East.

Zakaria:

Whether or not Bush deserves credit for everything that is happening in the Middle East, he has been fundamentally right about some big things.

Bush never accepted the view that Islamic terrorism had its roots in religion or culture or the Arab-Israeli conflict. Instead he veered toward the analysis that the region was breeding terror because it had developed deep dysfunctions caused by decades of repression and an almost total lack of political, economic and social modernization. The Arab world, in this analysis, was almost unique in that over the past three decades it had become increasingly unfree, even as the rest of the world was opening up. His solution, therefore, was to push for reform in these lands.

The theory did not originate with Bush's administration. Others had made this case: scholars like Bernard Lewis and Fouad Ajami, Thomas Friedman of The New York Times, the Arab intellectuals who wrote the United Nations' now famous "Arab Human Development Report" and even this writer. (Three weeks after 9/11 I wrote an essay titled "Why Do They Hate Us?" that made this case.) These ideas were gaining some ground in the Arab world, especially after 9/11. But Bush's adoption of them was absolutely crucial because he had the power to pressure the region's regimes. Efforts to change the dynamics of the Middle East had always collapsed in the past as its wily rulers would delay, obstruct and obfuscate. Bush has pushed them with persistence and, increasingly, he is trying to build a broader international effort. The results might surprise.

Cole:

I'm all for democratization in the Middle East, as a good in its own right. But I don't believe that authoritarian governance produced most episodes of terrorism in the last 60 years in the region. Terrorism was a weapon of the weak wielded against what these radical Muslims saw as a menacing foreign occupation. To erase that fact is to commit a basic error in historical understanding. It is why the US military occupation of Iraq is actually a negative for any "war on terror." Nor do I believe that democratization, even if it is possible, is going to end terrorism in and of itself.

You want to end terrorism? End unjust military occupations. By all means have Syria conduct an orderly withdrawal from Lebanon if that is what the Lebanese public wants. But Israel needs to withdraw from the Golan Heights, which belong to Syria, as well. The Israeli military occupation of Gaza and the West Bank must be ended. The Russian scorched earth policy in Chechnya needs to stop. Some just disposition of the Kashmir issue must be attained, and Indian enormities against Kashmiri Muslims must stop. The US needs to conduct an orderly and complete withdrawal from Iraq. And when all these military occupations end, there is some hope for a vast decrease in terrorism. People need a sense of autonomy and dignity, and occupation produces helplessness and humiliation. Humiliation is what causes terrorism.

I don't think Cole and Zakaria's arguments are all that divergent, though I think Cole's assertion that terrorism can be blamed on military occupations is uncharacteristically simple. I think it's more accurate to say that the legacy of European colonialism in the Middle East is a major, probably the major, factor in the growth of terrorism in the Middle East. Authoritarian governments, as Zakaria notes, in addition to being unjust (and thus un-Islamic) rulers, are seen by many fundamentalist groups as puppets of foreign governments, which strongly contributes to the resentment and humiliation which Cole identifies. Most of these countries, however, haven't been occupied by foreign powers for many years. For example, fourteen of the nineteen 9/11 hijackers were Saudis, yet Saudi Arabia is not currently experiencing an occupation. Saudi Arabia is, however, ruled by an authoritarian government which many devout Muslims view as illegitimate both because of its hugely inequitable stewardship of Arabian oil wealth, and because of its close relationship with the U.S.

Even though he was supporter of the Iraq war, Zakaria has been one of the most astute critics of Bush's handling of the invasion and its botched aftermath, which will continue to produce bad consequences even as it seems to have emboldened democracy activists in the region. And that, I think, is the big question: In the long run, what will prove stronger, resentment of foreign interference or desire for democracy? Will bad consequences produced by Bush's policies, the damage to Western alliances, the international terrorist jamboree that he is hosting in Iraq, his virtual carte blanche to Sharon, overwhelm the small democratic space that his rhetoric has possibly opened up in the Middle East?

I think it's too soon to tell, but there are positive signs. Youssef Ibrahim offers reasons to believe that the kifaya movement will continue to gather steam.

p.s. This is off the main topic, but I think Zakaria misrepresents somewhat Bernard Lewis' writing on the roots of Islamist terrorism. In his seminal essay The Roots of Muslim Rage, Lewis did argue that Islamist terrorism does to some extent have its roots in Islamic culture, specifically in resentment at the steady eclipsing of Islamic power by Christian empires, and at the current dominance of Arab Muslim societies by more technologically advanced Western powers. In his book What Went Wrong?, Lewis writes that much of Muslim resentment of the West can be attributed to Islam's history of military conquest, a feature which distinguishes Islam from the other two Abrahamic faiths, Judaism and Christianity, both of which grew up in stark opposition to authority. Judaism as we know it was largely developed in bondage, Jesus was rejected by his own people and executed as a criminal in the most hideous and shameful way possible, but Muhammad was a conqueror who brought the Middle East and North Africa under the sway of Islam. Lewis suggests that this fact is essential in understanding the Muslim fundamentalist phenomenon. Not that I particularly agree with Lewis, but that's what he wrote.

Anyone interested in a critique of Lewis' "Clash of Civilizations" thesis (which was purloined and developed into an entire strain of misguided foreign policy thought by Samuel Huntington) should see Richard Bulliet's excellent The Case for Islamo-Christian Civilization.